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COMMENTS 
LINMARK ASSOCIATES, INC. v. TOWNSHIP OF 
WILLINGBORO, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977) - "FOR SALE" 
SIGNS: THE RIGHT TO YELL "FIRE" IN AN INTE-
GRATING NEIGHBORHOOD? 
In Linmark, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a ban 
on "For Sale" and "Sold" lawn signs that was enacted to 
curb what residents perceived as panic selling by white 
homeowners. The authors analyze the effect of this case on 
"For Sale" sign bans that exist in Maryland. The authors 
also examine the decision in light of other recent commercial 
speech cases which have established a first amendment 
interest in the free flow of truthful and legitimate commer-
cial information. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1960's, enormous progress has been made in the 
field of civil rights, particularly in the effort to end housing 
segregation. With the enactment of a comprehensive federal fair 
housing law1 and the United States Supreme Court's landmark 
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970). 
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decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer CO.,2 the law opened the way 
for the influx of minority citizens into previously all white 
neighborhoods. The integration of minorities into many once 
segregated areas has not always been a smooth process, however.3 
This has been partially the result of the infection of fear among 
residents that their formerly all white, presently integrating, 
communities were being steadily metamorphosized into dispropor-
tionately black enclaves. Searching for the causes of their perceived 
problem, many communities arrived at the conclusion that "For 
Sale" and "Sold" lawn signs created the impression that "too many" 
whites were leaving, and "too many" blacks were entering, their 
communities. This impression, in turn, was believed to be the cause 
of a panic psychology that further catalyzed white egress from these 
communities. 
Many communities, including some in Maryland,4 enacted 
ordinances prohibiting persons from posting "For Sale" or "Sold" 
signs in front of homes.5 While there are a number of conceivable 
reasons for the enactment of these ordinances,6 local governments 
have acted, typically, for two reasons. One reason for sign ban 
ordinances is to prevent "blockbusting" or "panic peddling," the 
practice of inducing property owners to sell their homes at a price 
lower than fair market value because of the actual or rumored entry 
2. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (held that an 1886 civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, enacted 
under the authority of the thirteenth amendment, barred all discrimination in 
housing, private as well as public). 
3. See generally United States Commission on Civil Rights, Twenty Years After 
Brown: Equal Opportunity in Housing (1975). 
4. See text accompanying notes 134-152 infra. 
5. For examples of these ordinances, see Comment, The Constitutionality of a 
Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting "For Sale," "Sold," or "Open" Signs to Prevent 
Blockbusting, 14 ST. LoUIS L.J. 686 (1970). 
6. Some reasons include: (1) encouragement of "racial steering," the practice of 
showing prospective black home buyers only homes in black areas while steering 
them away from white areas. See, e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of 
Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 803-04 (3rd Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Racial 
Steering: The Real Estate Brokers and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 153 (1975); (2) 
concern for the safety and health of jJ{e neighborhood residents. Laska & 
Hewitt, Are Laws Against "For Sale'/Signs Constitutional? Substantive Due 
Process Revisited, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 153, 155 (1975); (3) to maintain the 
appearance of the community, i.e. aesthetic concerns. Id. See also Note, Aesthetic 
Zoning: A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 430 (1965). 
The first purpose is illegal under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 (Supp. V 1975) (this section also makes the practice of "blockbusting" or 
"panic peddling" illegal). And as "For Sale" signs are too few and too small to be 
of genuine aesthetic concern or to present a realistic danger to the safety and 
health of a community's residents, the latter purposes cannot be legitimately 
asserted as rational bases for the ban of "For Sale" signs. See Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning 
and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 179 (1975); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1314 
(1958). 
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of minorities into the neighborhood.7 The other typical reason for 
sign bans is to prevent or stem "panic selling," which occurs when a 
resident, who is otherwise disposed to remain in his neighborhood, 
succumbs to anyone or more of a number of pressures to move out, 
when it appears that minorities are moving in.B 
While there have been numerous attacks on the constitutionality 
of bans on "For Sale" signs,9 nearly all of these ordinances were 
held to be constitutional, prior to Linmark. A typical community 
which perceived that it ailed from a steadily increasing depletion of 
white homeowners and applied a sign ban as its hoped-for cure was 
the Township of Willingboro, New Jersey. The citizens of Willing-
boro soon learned from the United States Supreme Court that the 
township's proposed cure, from a constitutional perspective, was 
worse than the perceived disease. The Supreme Court in Linmark 
held that Willingboro's ordinance was an unconstitutional abridge-
ment of free, albeit commercial, speech.lO 
II. THE LINMARK SETTING 
At the time of trial of Linmark, approximately fifty thousand 
people lived in Willingboro, New Jersey, which had always been a 
transient community, partly due to its proximity to Fort Dix, 
McGuire Air Force Base, and offices of several national corpora-
tions. ll Because of racial discrimination by Willingboro's developer 
during the 1950's, the township was initially an almost all white 
enclave. 12 By 1970, however, Willingboro had substantially achieved 
7. See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 419, 291 A.2d 161, 164 (19-72) 
(upholding constitutionality of Maryland's antiblockbusting statute, MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 56, § 230A). For further treatment of "blockbusting," see generally 
Comment, Blockbusting: Judicial and Legislative Response to Real Estate 
Dealers' Excesses, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 818 (1973); Note, Blockbusting; A Novel 
Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. 
PROB. 538 (1971); Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L. J. 170 (1970). 
8. See, e.g., Barrick Realty Inc. v. City of Gary Indiana, 354 F. Supp. 126, 135 (N.D. 
Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). The district court distinguished 
"blockbusting" or "panic peddling" from "panic selling" by pointing out that the 
former depends upon direct inducements or face-to-face contact between people 
while the latter does not. 354 F. Supp. at 134-35. 
9. Such attacks have usually challenged the ordinances on the basis of: 1) the 
municipality's statutory constitutional authority to so legislate, 2) the general 
acceptability of the methods which the municipality uses, 3) preemption of the 
subject matter by other state law, usually the real estate broker licensing statute, 
4) freedom of speech and contract, or 5) the restriction on the right to travel. 
Laska & Hewitt, supra note 6, at 154 n.2. 
10. 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977). 
11. Id. at 1615, 1617. 
12. Willingboro was developed by Levitt & Sons in the late 1950's as a middle-
income, residential community. When Levitt refused to sell its houses to minority 
group members, the New Jersey Supreme Court enjoined such discrimination. 
Levitt and Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination in State Department of 
Education, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960). A 
Human Relations Corpmission was then formed, and the development of the 
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its goal of racial integration; from 1960 to 1973, the township 
experienced an expansion in its nonwhite population from a low of 
.005 percent to a high of 18.2 percent.13 By the early 1970's, however, 
the residents of Willingboro became concerned about the possibility 
that the township's population would become disproportionately 
black in race and that property values would decline accordingly.14 
The Willingboro Township Council held public meetings at which it 
was concluded that the major cause of the township's population 
change was the proliferation of "For Sale" and "Sold" lawn signs in 
front of Willingboro homes.I5 These lawn signs, the township council 
concluded, had created a panic psychology among whites that led to 
panic selling. The council determined that the rate of white egress 
and black ingress would stabilize if there were no "For Sale" and 
"Sold" signs on front lawns in Willingboro. The councilpersons 
enacted an ordinance banning the posting of any such signs on 
residential property in the township.16 Consequently, an action was 
brought by a corporate property owner and a real estate broker 
against the township, alleging that the ordinance unconstitutionally 
deprived them of their right of free speech under the first and 
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. 17 
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
held the ordinance unconstitutional, reasoning that the sign ban 
amounted to "censorship" by denying home owners the right freely 
to express their desires to sell their property.IS The court added that 
"it appears that the true thrust of these sign ban ordinances is to 
promote a racial balance, or more properly, a racial imbalance in 
order to perpetuate existing racial lines."19 Without these signs, the 
court continued, buyers would be forced to turn to realtors who would 
"steer" blacks away from white areas.a! The district court concluded 
community with full integration was actively encouraged. "Willingboro became a 
racially integrated community with each of its ten 'parts' having all racial and 
ethnic groups living together, with no section which could be denominated a 
white section, a black section or a Spanish-speaking section." Linmark 
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 789 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
13. 97 S. Ct. at 1615. 
14. Id. at 1615-16. 
15.Id. 
16. Id. at 1616. 
17. The first amendment guarantee of free speech has been held applicable to the 
states under the fourteenth amendment "due process" clause. Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Other constitutional questions raised at the 
district court and court of appeals levels, 535 F.2d at 789, were not addressed by 
the Supreme Court. Linmark Associates, a New Jersey corporation, sold the 
property in question, and the case therefore became moot as to its interests. The 
Court ruled, however, that there remained a case and controversy as to the 
realtor MeIlman. 97 S. Ct. at 1615 n.!. 
18. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, No. 74-1120 (D. N.J. Feb. 
20, 1975). The district court's unreported opinion is reproduced in a footnote to 
the opinion of the court of appeals, 535 F.2d 786, 792-93 n.5. 
19. Id. 
20.Id. 
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that the ultimate effect of the sign ban could be to freeze in past 
discrimination by denying blacks a fair opportunity to find suitable 
housing. 21 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the district court and upheld the ordinance.22 The court 
based its analysis on the "commercial speech" exception to the first 
amendment's free speech guarantee, first recognized in the 1942 
Supreme Court case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. 23 Recognizing the 
questionable authority of the doctrine as initially pronounced and in 
light of recent decisions,24 the court of appeals updated the standard 
for determining whether commercial speech should be accorded first 
amendment protection. 
The standard applied by the court was two-pronged. The court 
first determined whether the speech involved - the message 
communicated by "For Sale" signs - was primarily commercia1.25 
Finding that it was, because the signs merely proposed a commercial 
transaction,26 the court applied a balancing test: The governmental 
interest27 in the regulation of the signs was weighed against any 
potential infringement of first amendment rights. 28 The court of 
appeals experienced little difficulty in tipping the scales in favor of 
the valid governmental interest in preventing panic selling.29 The 
court reasoned that the evidence established that Willingboro had 
been integrated remarkably free of discriminatory practices, that 
there was no evidence of actual or intended racial discrimination in 
the sale of homes in Willingboro, and that it was to resist the threat 
to the township's integrated status that the council enacted the sign 
ban ordinance.30 
21. Id. 
22. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 
1976), reu'd, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977). 
23. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See text accompanying notes 42-47 infra. 
24. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); text accompanying notes 
51-64 infra. 
25. 535 F.2d at 794-95. 
26.Id. 
27. The court stated that the "paramount governmental public interest" here was the 
"termination of a panic selling psychology and its impetus to housing 
segregation." Id. at 795. 
28. Id. at 795-805. 
29. Id. at 795, 805. 
30. Id. at 798. The court also commented, id. at 801: 
To slow an artificial, fear-accelerated pace of racial change is not to seek 
a specific population ratio and is not itself a form of racial discrimina-
tion. When a fact of human experience, such as panic selling, is 
recognized and acted against by those on the firing line in the 
community, we the more cloistered should not interpose our conjectures 
regarding motive to stifle such action, in the absence of clear evidence of 
violation of fundamental constitutional rights. 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed. 31 The Court framed 
the issue as "whether the first amendment permits a municipality to 
prohibit the posting of 'For Sale' or 'Sold' signs when the 
municipality acts to stem what it perceives as the flight of white 
homeowners from a racially integrated community."32 Jus.tice 
Marshall expressed the unanimous view of the eight participating 
members of the Court,33 in holding that the Willingboro ordinance 
was constitutionally infirm. The Court affirmed that commercial 
speech was within the scope of the free speech guarantee of the first 
amendment, and found that Willingboro's ordinance violated the 
petitioners' right to free speech for two reasons. Willingboro failed to 
establish a sufficient relationship between the sign ban and a 
diminution of panic selling34 and, more importantly, impaired the 
free flow of truthful information of "vital concern" to the township's 
residents. 35 
A complete analytical understanding of Linmark can best be 
gained through an item by item examination of the considerations 
faced and dealt with by the Supreme Court in its decision. 
Essentially, both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit applied a "balancing test"36 in arriving at their 
respective conclusions. Why, then, did their results differ? The 
answer lies in the two courts' resolutions of two questions. How 
strong is the first amendment interest in commercial speech which 
takes the form of lawn signs advertising the availability of homes 
for sale? How important is the governmental interest in banning 
these signs in order to diminish what the community perceives to be 
panic selling? 
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
A. Definition 
The standards by which particular speech has been deemed to be 
"commercial" have never been delineated by the Supreme Court. The 
most that the Court has said about the subject is that commercial 
speech is speech "which does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction."37 One student commentator recently proposed a 
definition of commercial speech that seems to have been implicit in 
the Court's approach to the concept: 
31. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977). 
32. Id. at 1615. 
33. Rehnquist, J., did not participate. Id. at 1621. 
34. Id. at 1619-20. 
35. Id. at 1619. 
36. The court of appeals' use of this test can be found at 535 F.2d at 796-805, while 
the Supreme Court's analysis is at 97 S. Ct. at 1619-20. 
37. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
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[T]he definition of commercial speech ... is (1) speech that 
refers to a specific brand name product or service, (2) made 
by a speaker with a financial interest in the sale of the 
advertised product or service, in the sale of a competing 
product or service, or in the distribution of the speech, (3) 
that does not advertise an activity itself protected by the 
first amendment. 38 
79 
The speech in "For Sale" signs fits very neatly into this proposed 
definition. A real estate "For Sale" sign refers to a specific home, is 
made by either the homeowner or broker, both of whom possess a 
financial interest in the sale of the home, and does not advertise an 
activity - the buying and selling of homes - itself protected by the 
first amendment.39 A "For Sale" sign is, therefore, a form of 
commercial speech.40 
B. History 
Commercial speech, initially accorded no first amendment 
protection, today enjoys a large measure of such protection.41 This 
form of speech was first recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1942 
case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,42 in which the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a New York City ordinance forbidding distribu-
tion of printed handbills bearing commercial advertising matter. 
Chrestensen printed and distributed handbills which solicited the 
public to tour his submarine exhibit, on one side, and protested the 
city's denial of wharfage for his submarine, on the other side.43 In a 
brief opinion, the Supreme Court held that "purely commercial 
advertising" was not accorded first amendment protection and was 
subject to state legislative regulation.44 
38. Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New 
Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 236 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Commercial Advertising]. 
39. Compare Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) with Linmark. The buying and 
selling of homes has never been held to be protected by the first amendment. 
40. 535 F.2d at 794-96. 
41. For a fuller treatment of the background of the commercial speech doctrine and 
its status today, see generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
429 (1971); Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: 
New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975); Commercial 
Advertising, supra note 38. 
42. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
43. Id. at 54. The Court stated that the protest against official action had been added 
only in an attempt to evade the ordinance, and therefore ignored this aspect of 
the handbill, classifying it as "commercial advertising." 
44.Id. 
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The Court espoused a standard, later labeled the "primary 
purpose" test,45 for determining whether speech was considered 
commercia1.46 Under this test, if the speaker's objective was 
motivated by monetary profit, the speech would be deemed 
commercial and given no first amendment protection. If the 
speaker's objective was to disseminate information or views 
concerning issues of public interest, the speech was afforded the full 
protection of the first amendment. There was, thus, a two·level 
theory of the first amendment that classified speech as either fully 
protected or wholly unprotected.47 
The commercial speech doctrine lay relatively dormant until 
1964, when, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,48 the Supreme Court 
rejected the primary purpose test in favor of the "content" test. 49 
Under this test, if the content of the communication expressed 
information of public interest and concern, it was afforded the full 
protection of the first amendment. The Sullivan Court, however, 
distinguished Chrestensen's "purely commercial" advertising from 
the "editorial" advertising at issue in Sullivan,50 thereby leaving 
45. Commercial Advertising, supra note 38, at 208. In cases involving Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the Court has held that since the primary purpose of the Witnesses 
was to engage in religious activities, their solicitations were clearly more than 
"purely commercial speech." E.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); 
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). 
46. 316 U.S. at 53-54. The reasoning of the Court was later to be severely criticized 
by Justice Douglas who had joined the majority in Chrestensen, apparently 
unaware of its implications. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission 
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 397-404 (1973) (Douglas and Stewart, JJ., 
dissenting) (Chrestensen should be limited to its facts); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Gorve, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(Chrestensen "ill·conceived"); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Chrestensen ruling was "casual, almost offhand, 
and does not survive reflection"). 
47. Commercial Advertising, supra note 38, at 208-09. When first amendment rights 
are deemed to exist, the Court accords them a "preferred" position, Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), and requires a demonstration of a "legitimate," 
"significant," or "compelling" governmental interest to justify infringements. 
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973) (mailing of unsolicited 
pornography); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (black 
student demonstration at high school); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1963) (Virginia statute banning improper solicitation of legal or professional 
business held inapplicable to NAACP activities). Wholly unprotected forms of 
speech include "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.s. 568 
(1942); obscenity, Roth v. United States, 345 U.S. 476 (1957), libel, Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969). 
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan was a landmark libel case involving a paid 
advertisement in a newspaper criticizing police action against members of the 
civil rights movement in the South. Sullivan elevated the tort of libel to a 
constitutional level. See generally Murnaghan, Ave Defamation, Atque Vale 
Libel and Slander, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 202 (1976). 
49. 376 U.S. at 266. 
50. Id. at 265-66. The Court stated: 
The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense 
in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated 
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unquestioned Chrestensen's holding that purely commercial speech 
was subject to state legislative regulation. 
In Pittsburgh Press Co. u. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human 
Relations,51 the Supreme Court held that an ordinance prohibiting 
the classification of job advertisements by sex did not violate the 
first amendment.52 Though the Court stated that the speech involved 
was a "classic example of. commercial speech,"53 the Court 
apparently considered the sex-conscious ads to be unprotected 
because discriminatory hiring was in itself illegal,54 rather than 
purely because of the ads' commercial nature. More significantly, the 
Court stated in dictum that had such hiring practices not been 
illegal, it would have had to balance the first amendment interest in 
advertising jobs against the governmental interest in discouraging 
sex discrimination. 55 The proverbial foot was in the door. 
This dictum in Pittsburgh Press was the first sign of erosion in 
the "absolutely" unprotected status of commercial speech pro-
nounced in Chrestensen. This erosion continued in Bigelow u. 
Virginia,56 in which the Supreme Court labeled Chrestensen's 
holding as "distinctly limited,"57 and held that speech was not 
stripped of first amendment protection merely because it appeared in 
the form of advertising. 58 The Bigelow Court overturned the 
conviction of a Virginia newspaper editor who had published an 
advertisement for a New York abortion referral agency, in violation 
of a Virginia statute forbidding the publication of information that 
might "encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion."59 The Court 
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed 
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose 
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and 
concern. . . . That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement 
is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and 
books are sold .... Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers 
from carrying 'editorial advertisements' of this type, and so might shut 
off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by 
persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities -
who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not 
members of the press. Id. at 266 (citations omitted). 
51. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
52. Id. at 391. 
53. Id. at 385. 
54. Id. at 388. 
55. Id. at 389. The Court there stated: "Any First Amendment interest which might 
be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might 
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is al· 
together absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the re-
striction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity." 
56. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
57. Id. at 819. 
58. Id. at 818. 
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960). The Court had initially vacated and remanded 
Bigelow's conviction for further consideration, 413 U.S. 909 (1973), in light of the 
landmark abortion cases of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Virginia Supreme Court then reaffirmed the conviction, 
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applied a balancing test to determine whether the Virginia statute 
was unconstitutional. This test involved "assessing the First 
Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public 
interest allegedly served by the regulation."60 The stronger the first 
amendment interest, the greater the governmental interest had to be 
in order to justify constitutionally any regulation of the content of 
the speech. 
The Bigelow Court found that the abortion advertisement 
publicized an activity protected by the constitution,61 and conveyed 
information of potential interest and value to the general public.62 
Bigelow, therefore, did not involve purely commercial speech, but 
rather, a mixture of commercial and pure63 speech. As such, the 
advertisement was protected by the first amendment. The Court 
found it unnecessary to describe the precise extent to which 
commercial speech could be regulated, because it was necessary only 
to establish that the ad had a sufficient public interest in order to 
cloak it with first amendment protection.64 
Finally, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy u. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc.,65 the Supreme Court held that speech which 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction deserved some 
first amendment protection.66 The Court overturned a Virginia 
statute that made advertising the prices of prescription drugs 
"unprofessional conduct" subjecting violators to suspension or 
revocation of their licenses and to civil penalties.67 Adopting the 
Bigelow balancing test, the Court first found that the consumers' 
interest in making intelligent and well-informed economic decisions 
made the free flow of commercial information "indispensable."68 The 
Court then decided that the disseminators and recipients of 
advertising had first amendment rights, respectively, to disseminate 
and receive truthful commercial information.69 Balancing these first 
amendment rights against Virginia's paternalistic and unsubstanti-
Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). The Supreme 
Court took the case again and agreed with the state that this was a first 
amendment case rather than an abortion case. 421 U.S. 809, 815 n.5 (1975). 
60. 421 U.S. at 826. 
61. [d. at 822. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973). 
62. 421 U.S. at 822. 
63. Speech that communicates information or opinion on political or social policies 
or other matters of great public interest has been labeled "pure speech" and held 
to enjoy the protections of the first amendment. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 559 (1965). 
64. 421 U.S. at 825. 
65. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
66. [d. at 762. 
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974). In an interesting due process analysis, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitutional a similar statute 
prohibiting drug price advertising in Maryland Board of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, 
Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973). 
68. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
69. See id. at 756-57, 762-65. 
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ated70 belief that the impact of drug price advertisements would be 
detrimental to the public, the Court determined that the best 
approach was to "open the channels of communication rather than 
to close them."71 
The Virginia Pharmacy Court constructed a new foundation for 
first amendment protection of commercial speech. Professor Meikle-
john argued that the first amendment was intended by its framers to 
protect "pure" or "political" speech.72 Pure speech should be 
protected almost as absolutely, argued Meiklejohn, because it is 
speech that effectuates rational self-government.73 Professor Redish 
contended that Meiklejohn's rationale for protecting political speech 
should also be made applicable to speech that aids in "rational self-
fulfillment" in the economic world. 74 It was clear that the Virginia 
Pharmacy Court was in accord with Redish's position. The Court's 
new foundation, then, was the need for truthful commercial 
information in a free enterprise economic system.75 
By the time Linmark was decided by the Supreme Court, certain 
guidelines had already been established in analyzing commercial 
speech cases. These guidelines concerned permissible forms of 
commercial speech regulation the presence of anyone of which 
would render a balancing test unnecessary: 
(1) time, place, or manner restrictions which 
(a) are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, 
(b) serve a significant governmental interest, and 
(c) leave open ample alternative channels for commun-
ication of the information.76 
(2) Restrictions on false or misleading advertising.44 
(3) Restrictions on advertisements which propose illegal 
transactions.78 
(4) Possible restrictions on the electronic broadcasting 
media which, because of their unique characteristics 
make regulation more appropriate in the public inter-
est.79 
70. See id. at 766-70. The Court found that the State could maintain professional 
standards and protect pharmacists from harmful competition without keeping 
the public in ignorance of the lawful terms that competing pharmacists were 
offering. 
71. Id. at 770. 
72. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POUTICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960). 
73. See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 255. 
74. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and 
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 434-47 (1971). 
75. See 425 U.S. at 762-65. 
76. Id. at 771. 
77. Id. at 771-72. 
78. Id. at 772-73. 
79. See id. at 773. This is implied by the Court's cryptic reference to Capitol 
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. 1971), afi'd sub nom. Capitol 
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C. Application to Linmark 
The "For Sale" and "Sold" signs at issue in Linmark constituted 
a form of commercial speech.80 The Court determined that the first 
amendment interest at stake in these types of signs was an 
important one: 
That ["For Sale" sign] information, which pertains to sales 
activity in Willingboro, is of vital interest to Willingboro 
residents, since it may bear on one of the most important 
decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise 
their families. . . . If dissemination of this information can 
be restricted, then every locality in the country can suppress 
any facts that reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a 
plausible claim can be made that disclosure would cause the 
recipients of the information to act "irrationally."81 
The Linmark Court determined, then, that there .existed a strong 
right to receive information from lawn signs relating to the 
availability of homes for sale. The right to receive that information 
carried with it the right to disseminate the information. 
The right to receive and disseminate information about homes 
for sale does not, however, automatically entail the right to 
disseminate that information at every time and place and in every 
manner. A sign ban can be upheld if it can be categorized 
successfully as a valid time, place, or manner restriction.82 An 
important hurdle cleared by the Linmark Court was the determina-
tion of the proper categorization of the sign ban ordinance -
whether the ordinance was aimed at the content of the signs' speech, 
in which case a Bigelow-type balancing test would have to be 
Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) which upheld 
the congressional ban on electronic communication of cigarette advertisements. 
This reference is disturbing, as the district court there expressly relied on 
Chrestensen to support its opinion. Note Judge Wright's interesting dissent, 333 
F. Supp. 582, 587-94 (D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting). 
80. See text accompanying noted 37-40 supra. 
81. 97 S. Ct. at 1620. 
82. The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment permits reasonable 
regulations of the time, place and manner of protected speech when those 
regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests. See, e.g., 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ban on willful making of any 
noise which disturbs the good order of school session on grounds adjacent to a 
school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban on demonstrations in or near 
a courthouse with the intent to obstruct justice); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 
(1949) (limitation on use of sound trucks). Such restrictions, however, must be 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976). 
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applied,83 or merely at the form of the speech, in which case it could 
be held valid.84 The Court found that the ordinance was not a time, 
place, or manner restriction at all. 
The sign ban ordinance did not leave open ample alternative 
channels for the communication of home sale availability to 
prospective home buyers. The Court pointed out that the options to 
which sellers were realistically relegated, such as newspaper 
advertising and real estate broker listing, involved more expense 
and less autonomy than "For Sale" signs, were less likely to reach 
persons not deliberately seeking sales information, and were less 
effective methods of communicating the message than were "For 
Sale" signs posted in front of available houses.85 The ordinance did 
not serve a significant township interest in regulating signs as such. 
Not all lawn signs were prohibited, but only those which contained 
the message that a particular house was for sale or was already 
sold.86 Presumably, political campaign signs, garage sale signs, and 
the like were permissible. The prohibited signs were not unavoidably 
intrusive,87 were not inappropriate for the eyes of any class of 
citizen,88 and did not produce a detrimental "secondary effect" on 
Willingboro.89 Finally, the sign ban could not be justified without 
reference to the content of the prohibited signs. The signs were 
prohibited, the Court explained, because of their alleged "primary 
effect" - that whites would flee Willingboro because of the 
implications of the signs' message.oo 
Application of the other pre-balancing test guidelines did not 
result in upholding the Willingboro sign ban ordinance. The types of 
signs involved in Linmark did not propose illegal transactions91 and 
did not contain false or misleading matter.92 They were signs that 
merely announced the fact that particular homes were for sale or 
had been sold, messages both legal and unambiguous in import. The 
stage was set for the Linmark Court to apply a balancing test. 
83. See 97 S. Ct. at 1617, 1619. 
84. See id. at 1618-19. 
85. [d. at 1618. 
86. [d. at 1619. 
87. ct. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (adult drive-in 
movie theater screen visible from public streets). 
88. Cf. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (D.C. 1971), 
aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 
1000 (1972) (relationship of cigarette commercial broadcasts on electronic media 
and their potential influence on young people). 
89. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (claim that 
concentration of adult movie theaters would cause area to deteriorate and 
become a focus of crime). 
90. 97 S. Ct. at 1619. 
91. C{. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376 (1973) (illegal sex discriminatory ads). 
92. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). 
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IV. STRIKING THE BALANCE 
In Linmark, the Court did not question the truth of Willingboro's 
contention that the maintenance of a racially integrated community 
was the object of the township's attempt to diminish alleged panic 
selling by banning . "For Sale" lawn signs. In fact, the Court 
recognized the importance of maintaining a racially integrated 
community.93 The strength of Willingboro's interest could not, 
however, rest only in the ultimate, long range goal of the sign ban. 
The importance of that governmental interest also had to lie in the 
substantiality of the relationship between the more immediate 
purpose of the sign ban - diminution of panic selling - and the 
sign ban itself.94 The Court attempted to determine whether the sign 
ban diminished panic selling. Basic to that determination was the 
Court's inquiry into whether there was panic selling in Willingboro 
in the first place. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence indicated only 
that there was special concern among the citizens of Willingboro 
that "For Sale" signs would cause panic selling, not that there was, 
in fact, panic selling.95 Although the number of signs posted in 
Willingboro substantially decreased after the ordinance went into 
effect, there was no evidence of a decrease in transiency. 96 In fact, 
the evidence indicated that the sign ban had little or no effect upon 
the number of home sale transactions in Willingboro.97 Moreover, 
the Willingboro Township Council enacted the sign ban ordinance 
with knowledge that Willingboro homes were not only not declining 
in value, but in fact increasing in value at a rate greater than that in 
comparable communities.98 The Court stated, in sum, that there was 
scant proof that the sign ban reduced public awareness of, or 
decreased public concern about, realty sales.99 The sign ban, the 
Court continued, had only unfortunate effects. Thirty-five percent of 
93. 97 S. Ct. at 1619 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 
205 (1972». 
94. See id. at 1619. 
95. See id. at 1619-20. 
96. [d. at 1617. 
97. Willingboro's real estate agent witnesses at trial both stated that their business 
had increased by 25% since the ordinance was enacted. [d. 
98. [d. at 1616. 
99. [d. at 1619-20. The Court stated: "[T]he evidence does not support the council's 
apparent fears that Willingboro was experiencing a substantial incidence of 
panic selling by white homeowners. A fortiori, the evidence does not establish 
that 'For Sale' signs in front of 2% of Willingboro homes were a major cause of 
panic selling." [d. at 1620. The Court also cited a law journal article which 
suggested that a prohibition on signs may, in fact, incite panic selling. Though 
not discussed by the Court, the same article argued that no legislation 
prohibiting "For Sale" signs could be rationally justified on due process grounds 
by panic selling. Laska & Hewitt, Are Laws Against "For Sale" Signs 
Constitutional? Substantive Due Process Revisited, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 153 
(1975). 
1977] "For Sale" Signs 87 
all prospective home purchasers learned of available for-sale homes 
through lawn signs. lOo This group of potential buyers was cut off 
from that convenient source of information, and was left with no 
alternative but to turn to real estate brokers in order to find 
available homes, a more expensive and less autonomous route. lOl 
Willingboro proved an insubstantial relationship between the 
sign ban and doubtfully existent panic selling. The township 
possessed a weak governmental interest in banning the signs, at 
best. The petitioners, on the other hand, had a strong first 
amendment interest in the use of "For Sale" signs on their 
property.102 It was an easy matter for the Court to conclude that the 
Bigelow balance between first amendment and government interests 
weighed heavily in favor of the former in Linmark. 
V. THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of the Willingboro sign ban ordinance. The court of 
appeals decided Linmark, however, without the benefit of the 
Supreme Court's holding in Virginia Pharmacy.lo3 The principle that 
persons have the right to receive and disseminate truthful commer-
cial information was not a part of constitutional law at the time of 
the court of appeals' decision, therefore. Even with the backdrop of 
Bigelow, the theme of Chrestensen was still prevalent in the court of 
appeals' opinion.I04 
In determining whether the sign ban constituted a time, place, or 
manner restriction, the court of appeals, contrary to the Supreme 
Court, was satisfied that ample alternative means of expression 
existed. The third circuit stated that "[n]ewspaper ads, in-town 
window displays or other possible means of conveying the desire to 
sell remain[ed] fully available to all."I05 The Supreme Court rejected 
these alternatives, and also rejected as unrealistic the use of leaflets, 
sound trucks, and demonstrations. 106 
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court differed in their 
respective analyses of Willingboro's governmental interest in the 
sign ban. The Supreme Court demanded that the detrimental effect 
of permitting the posting of "For Sale" signs be well substantia-
ted.107 The court of appeals, however, was satisfied that an adverse 
100. 97 S. Ct. at 1616. 
101. [d. at 1618. 
102. [d. at 1620-21. The court of appeals decided Linmark on April 28, 1976, just 
twenty·six days before the Supreme Court decided Virginia Pharmacy on May 
24, 1976. . 
104. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 795-96 
(3rd Cir. 1976). 
105. [d. at 797. 
106. 97 S. Ct. at 1618. 
107. [d. at 1619-20. 
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effect was apt to occur if the posting of signs was allowed to 
continue,lOs taking the approach that "an ounce of prevention is 
worth a pound of cure."109 The court of appeals did not have at its 
disposal the Supreme Court's analysis of the state interest in 
Virginia Pharmacy.110 
VI. BARRICK REALTY: IS ACTUAL PANIC SELLING 
ENOUGH? 
It is still not clear whether a jurisdiction could advance a 
justification of sufficient strength to support constitutionally a 
prohibition on "For Sale" signs on residential property. Prior to 
Linmark, the leading case in the sign ban field was Barrick Realty, 
Inc. u. City of Gary.l11 In Barrick, a federal district court upheld the 
constitutionality of a Gary, Indiana, ordinance prohibiting "For 
Sale" signs, which was enacted in order to reduce "panic selling" by 
whites. 11 2 The district court noted that the ordinance was enacted for 
the ultimate purpose of promoting, rather than impeding, integra-
tion, and that the sign ban had a reasonable tendency toward 
achieving that objective. ll3 In dealing with the free speech issue, the 
district court cited Chrestensen as authority for its statement that 
"reasonable regulations upon communication of a purely commercial 
nature are not subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment."1l4 
The court emphasized that the potential public benefit from the sign 
ban outweighed any harm to those wishing to post "For Sale" 
signs.l15 Any additional expense or delay which might result from 
having to use alternative means of advertising were considered to be 
"minimal." 1 16 
108. See 535 F.2d at 799-800. 
109. Id. at 800. 
110. See 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
111. 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). 
112. 354 F. Supp. at 134. In the period between 1960 and 1970, the white population of 
Gary decreased by 24.9% while the nonwhite population increased by 34.9%. Id. 
The court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit added that the presence of numerous 
"For Sale" signs in some white neighborhoods was causing whites to move out 
"en masse." 491 F.2d at 163-64. 
113. 354 F. Supp. at 136. The court pointed out that fair housing laws attack the 
problem of segregation on two fronts: 1) they outlaw discrimination in the sale 
and rental of housing, thereby softening the barriers to the entry of blacks into 
white areas; 2) they attack the causes of panic among whites, thereby slowing 
their flight from changing neighborhoods. Id. at 135. The court reasoned that 
integration could not occur without proceeding on both fronts. It felt that the 
proliferation of "For Sale" signs in an integrating neighborhood aggravated the 
fears of white residents who were afraid of "being left behind," and consequently 
provoked panic selling. It added that "[tJhe challenged ordinance therefore 
removes a significant source of panic and selling pressure from those who 
wished to remain in a transitional neighborhood." Id. 
114. Id. at 132. Using Chrestensen as authority that commercial speech is subject to 
"reasonable regulation" is an understatement of the case's former scope. 
115. Id. at 136. 
116.Id. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed.!17 Adopting much of the district court's opinion, the court 
of appeals added that "the right to open housing means more than 
the right to move from an old ghetto to a new ghetto,"118 and that 
Gary's policy would encourage stable, integrated neighborhoods. ll9 
The only significant factual distinction between Linmark and 
Barrick is that the court of appeals in Barrick believed substantial 
panic selling to be extant,l20 while the Supreme Court121 and the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals122 in Linmark determined that panic 
selling was only incipient. Whether that distinction would make a 
difference to the Supreme Court should a Barrick-like case present 
itself is somewhat doubtful. The first amendment interest in 
disseminating and receiving information from "For Sale" signs is 
strong.123 It is doubtful that any more ample alternatives to "For 
Sale" signs than existed in Willingboro could be found in any other 
jurisdiction.124 To demonstrate a strong governmental interest in a 
sign ban in a jurisdiction in which panic selling is extant, the 
government would still be required to prove that its sign ban 
diminishes panic selling.125 
The district court and court of appeals in Barrick did not apply 
these principles. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its 
decision before the Supreme Court decided Bigelow and Virginia 
Pharmacy.126 The court of appeals in Barrick analyzed the facts of 
that case, therefore, without the benefit of the Supreme Court's 
holding that there is a right to disseminate and receive truthful 
commercial information. 127 Whereas the court of appeals in Barrick 
believed the "inconvenience of having to utilize alternative methods 
of advertising and information gathering" to be "minor,"128 the 
Linmark Court was convinced that the alternative means of 
disseminating this type of information were insufficient.129 The 
Linmark Court demanded that Willingboro show an actual diminu-
tion of panic selling in consequence of its sign ban. l30 The court of 
appeals in Barrick, however, was satisfied that a diminution of 
117. 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). 
118. Id. at 164. 
119. Id. at 164-65. 
120. See id. at 163-64. 
121. See 97 S. Ct. 1614, 1619-20 (1977). 
122. 535 F.2d 786, 799 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
123. See 97 S. Ct. at 1620. 
124. See id. at 1618. 
125. See id. at 1619-20. 
126. The Seventh Circuit decided Barrick in 1974 while Bigelow and Virginia 
Pharmacy were handed down in 1975 and 1976 respectively. 
127. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
128. 491 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1974). 
129. 97 S. Ct. at 1618. 
130. See id. at 1619-20. 
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panic selling was a conceivable consequence of Gary's sign ban. 131 
In short, had the Supreme Court also decided Barrick, it probably 
would have struck down Gary's ordinance for the same reasons it 
struck down Willingboro's ordinance. The Barrick situation would 
not have deterred the application of the principles that people have 
the right to disseminate and receive truthful commercial informa-
tion, that they have the option to act irrationally upon that 
information, and that "the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence."132 
If a jurisdiction can prove both that it is suffering from panic 
selling and that its sign ban actually diminishes that panic selling 
substantially, then it is uncertain whether the sign ban is consistent 
with the first amendment's guarantee of some commercial speech 
protection. The Supreme Court has never faced a situation of this 
type. On the one hand, a sign ban's actual diminution of real panic 
selling strengthens the governmental interest in the sign ban, and a 
much closer case than was presented in Linmark is present. On the 
other hand, the first amendment interest in "For Sale" signs is a 
weighty one. The only possible clue provided by the Linmark Court 
was that Court's use of the words of former Justice Brandeis from a 
political speech case: 
"If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, 
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression."133 
It is arguable, therefore, that in the absence of an "emergency" 
which threatens the very existence of a community, panic selling is a 
prima facie insufficient justification for a ban on "For Sale" signs. 
VII. MARYLAND LAW 
The Baltimore City Council, the Baltimore County Council, and 
the Maryland General Assembly have enacted legislation which 
either bans or provides for the ban of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs in 
their respective jurisdictions. To date there has been no judicial 
determination of whether these Maryland laws will survive the 
Linmark decision. 
Baltimore City Ordinance No. 701 impliedly prohibits the 
display of "For Sale" signs outside of single-family residences. 134 
131. See 491 F.2d at 163-65. 
132. 97 S. Ct. at 1620 (citing Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring». 
133. Id. 
134. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 30, § 10.0-22-(b)(1) as amended by Ordinance 
701 (July 19, 1974). Article 30 (1966) was superseded by Ordinance 1051 (April 20, 
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Because of the Linmark decision, the constitutionality of this 
ordinance is a hotly debated issue among many interested parties. 
Potential challenges to the constitutionality of the city ordinance are 
emerging in three forms: (1) violations of the ordinance, earmarked 
as "test cases;" (2) a declaratory judgment action; and (3) legislation. 
A group of black realtors has attempted to test the ordinance by 
posting approximately 100 "For Sale" signs in residential communi-
ties in Baltimore.135 The Greater Baltimore Board of Realtors decided 
to confront the issue directly, and announced its intention to file a 
petition in the Baltimore City Circuit Court for a declaratory 
decree.13s On the political front, a city council person introduced a bill 
before the city council to repeal the city's sign prohibition. 137 The 
councilperson stated that "[t]he city has ignored the constitutional 
mandate of the highest court in the land. Because of the Supreme 
Court's decision in the [Linmark] case, it's incumbent upon 
Baltimore to void the ordinance."138 Although it is not certain which 
forum will first force the issue, or when that will happen, it seems 
likely that a determination of the constitutionality of Baltimore 
City's sign ban ordinance is in the offing. 
The Linmark decision has not persuaded all involved that the 
city's ordinance must fall. The city solicitor's office has stated that it 
will continue to enforce the "For Sale" sign prohibition, as the office 
considers the ordinance dissimilar to the Willingboro ordinance. 139 
Although the solicitor's office has yet to couch its contention in more 
1971), a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Ordinance 701 amends this 1971 
ordinance. It states, in pertinent part: 
b. The following types of signs, subject to the limitations prescribed 
for them, shall be permitted for uses authorized as principal or 
conditional uses in Residence and Office-Residence Districts: 
1. One non-illuminated sale or lease sign for [each street frontage of 
the lot, not exceeding a height of five feet, and having an area not 
exceeding six square feet. For] multiple family dwellings, apartment 
hotels, and non-residential buildings. Such [such] sign shall not exceed a 
height of eight feet if free standing, and shall not extend above the roof 
line if attached to a building and shall not exceed an area of 36 square 
feet. 
The bracketed material indicates matter stricken from Ordinance 1051 while the 
italicized material indicates matter added to Ordinance 1051. By deft draftman-
ship, Ordinance 701 therefore excised language permitting "For Sale" signs in 
front of single family homes, thereby impliedly prohibiting such signs. Violation 
of the 1974 ordinance is a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of between $25 
and $100. § 11.0-7. 
135. The Sunday Sun, July 24, 1977, at F1, col. 1. 
136. Id. As of mid-November, 1977, however, the Board had not yet filed such a 
petition. 
137. City Council of Baltimore Bill No. 1031 (introduced June 27, 1977 by City 
Council person Michael B. Mitchell). 
138. The Sun, June 24, 1977, at D18, col. 6. 
139. The Sunday Sun, July 24, 1977, at F1, col. 1. Despite the publicity given the black 
realtors' posting of "For Sale" signs, the solicitor's office innocently reported 
that no violations have been referred to it for prosecution. The city zoning 
administrator, the person responsible for reporting the violations, stated that his 
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definitive terms, a community organization president has specifi-
cally asserted why he considers the two ordinances distinguisha-
ble. l4O He argued that, unlike the single-purpose Willingboro 
ordinance, which prohibited only "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, the 
implied ban in Baltimore City is part of a larger ban on "all" signs 
in residential neighborhoods.141 It is, however, a fundamental 
principle that a statute may be constitutional in one part while 
unconstitutional in another.142 If the invalid part is severable from 
the rest, the portion that is constitutional can stand, while that part 
that is unconstitutional can be stricken and rejected. 143 The aesthetic 
objectives behind the Baltimore City ordinance may support bans on 
other types of signs.144 The ban on "For Sale" signs, however, is 
clearly severable and must be supported by a strong governmental 
interest in order to outweigh - or possess a chance of outweighing 
- the important first amendment concerns at stake. The city's 
interest in its sign ban would seem to be weakened by the fact that 
its ordinance contains thirteen express exceptions to the prohibition 
of "all" signs. 145 
The only manner in which the Baltimore ban on "For Sale" 
signs can possibly pass constitutional scrutiny is by a showing of en 
masse panic selling that creates an "emergency" situation. In 
addition, the city would have to prove that its sign ban diminishes 
such panic selling. It is doubtful, however, that sufficient evidence of 
an emergency situation could be adduced in Baltimore. Should the 
issue ripen into a judicial dispute, the Maryland courts will probably 
find that panic selling in Baltimore is not of a magnitude sufficient 
for the state interest to overshadow the first amendment interest in 
the free flow of truthful information about available for-sale homes. 
In 1972, the Baltimore County Council enacted an ordinance 
prohibiting persons from displaying "For Sale" or "Sold" signs in 
inspectors have not yet received any complaints, and will not issue citations 
unless someone calls and objects. The city is obviously avoiding a confrontation 
while it reexamines the continued validity of its ordinance in light of Linmark. 
140. Pretl, Should "For Sale" Signs Be Banned Here? The Sun, June 25, 1977, at A14, 
col. 3. 
141. Id. 
142. Chaplin sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Baltimore v. O'Conor, 147 
Md. 639, 128 A. 759 (1925). 
143. Id. Article 30, § 2.0-3 of the Baltimore City Code (as amended by Ordinance 1051) 
provides that in case of judicial determination of the unconstitutionality of a 
portion of the statute, the Mayor and City Council declare that they would have 
supported the remaining provisions of the statute. But see Anne Arundel County 
v. Moushabek, 269 Md. 419, 428, 306 A.2d 517, 522 (1973). 
144. While aesthetic considerations may play a role in the zoning process, an 
ordinance based on aesthetics alone, which does not enhance the public welfare, 
is invalid as an impermissible use of police powers. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973). See generally 3 
U. BALT. L. REV. 125 (1973). 
145. BALTIMORE CITY, MD. CODE art. 30, § 1O.0-1(f)(1-5), -2(b)(1-8). 
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any area designated by the Council as "prohibited." 146 In an 
unreported per curiam opinion147 handed down twenty-five days 
after Linmark was decided, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
avoided first amendment questions by upholding a lower court 
decision which invalidated the ordinance on procedural grounds. 148 
Section 230C of Article 56149 grants the Maryland Real Estate 
Commission the authority to suspend the use of "For Sale" and 
"Sold" signs by real estate licensees in areas determined by the 
commission to be "Real Estate Conservation Areas." Such a ban can 
only be imposed after a finding that either: 
(1) the racial or economic stability of a neighborhood is 
threatened by the volume of real estate transactions, or 
(2) an abnormal real estate market with depressed values is 
developing in a neighborhood because of excessive sales offerings, or 
(3) certain methods of advertising or solicitation could be 
damaging to the public or to the dignity and integrity of the real 
estate profession. l50 
Although the constitutionality of this statute has never been tested 
in the Maryland courts, it is vulnerable to attack under the first and 
fourteenth amendments. 
A Georgia statute, similar to § 230C was held to be violative of 
the due process and equal protection ctauses of the fourteenth 
amendment in DeKalb Real Estate Bd. v. Chairman of Bd. of 
Comm'rs. i51 The DeKalb court found that, as the statute applied only 
to real estate brokers and not to homeowners, it unconstitutionally 
"put persons into classes based upon criteria unrelated to the 
purpose of the legislation."152 Should the Maryland courts find 
DeKalb unpersuasive, it will still be necessary to justify the state's 
interest in the statute in light of Linmark's mandatory authority. 
Whether the real estate sign ban ordinances now in effect in 
Maryland, or any other jurisdiction, can pass constitutional muster 
turns solely on how narrowly the Linmark decision is read. In view 
of the lack of striking differences between the Maryland and 
Linmark settings, the Maryland ordinances will likely be found 
unconstitutional. 
VIII. OTHER IMPLICATIONS 
The ramifications of the Linmark decision extend well beyond 
the Court's disaffirmance of "For Sale" sign proscriptions. The 
146. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD. CODE, § 14-24 to -29 (Cum Supp. 1975). 
147. Baltimore County, Md. v. Wallich, No. 644 (Ct. Spec. App. May 27, 1977). 
148. [d. The court found that Baltimore County failed to take the requisite procedural 
steps for enacting a zoning ordinance. 
149. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230C (Supp. 1977). 
150. [d. 
151. 372 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
152. [d. at 754. 
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marked death of the commercial speech exception coupled with the 
enhanced constitutional value in the free flow of commercial 
information raise other questions. 
One fertile topic of interest also concerns the dissemination of 
speech involving real estate transactions. Section 3604(e) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968153 proscribes certain speech for the purpose of 
preventing "blockbusting." In a typical blockbusting situation, a 
realtor persuades an individual to sell his property because, 
allegedly, minorities are "moving in" and property values are 
declining as a result. Consequently, the homeowner sells to the 
realtor at a deflated price, and the realtor then sells to a minority 
group member at an inflated price. 
Several realtors prosecuted for "blockbusting" under § 3604(e) 
have attempted to assert a constitutional right to disseminate 
truthful information about the changing racial characteristics of a 
neighborhood. 154 Whether a lone congressional policy of promoting 
racial integration, without the benefit of the now laid-to-rest 
commercial speech exception, will sustain a court ruling under 
§ 3604(e) is now in doubt. This is particularly true since the statute is 
not a time, place or manner restriction, but is a proscription on 
content in that it proscribes realtors from dispensing information 
about particular subjects, whether or not the information is truthful. 
In support of the continued validity of § 3604(e) is the Pittsburgh 
Press principle that when speech is part of unlawful conduct it is not 
entitled to first amendment protection.155 Since the Fair Housing Act 
proscribes steering and blockbusting by realtors, speech related to 
such unlawful conduct may be unprotected also. 
Another question impliedly raised by Linmark and other post-
Virginia Pharmacy cases is whether the Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 196~, 156 which prohibits cigarette advertising on 
television and radio, remains constitutionally sound. In Capitol 
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,157 the Supreme Court affirmed without 
opinion a district court's holding that the federal government has 
the power to regulate advertising on the broadcasting media. 158 The 
district court relied, in part, on the now extinct commercial speech 
exception to the first amendment. The court reiterated the Chres-
tensen principle that "product advertising is less vigorously 
153. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. V 1975). 
154. E.g., U.S. v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 826 (1973). The constitutionality of Maryland's antiblockbusting statute, 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (Cum. Supp. 1977), has similarly withstood a first 
amendment challenge in State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 291 A.2d 161 (1972). 
155. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376 (1973). 
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970). 
157. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aiI'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting 
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
158. 333 F. Supp. at 584. 
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protected than other forms of speech."159 Should the Act face a 
constitutional challenge, it is possible that the Court will recognize 
an insurmountable right of the American public to receive informa-
tion about the availability and individual merits of cigarettes, even 
if the reception of such advertisements would cause Americans to 
make the irrational decision to smoke. On the other hand, the Court 
might yield to the strong state interest in public health and find the 
personal decision of whether or not to smoke to be a first amendment 
interest of a lesser magnitude than those in Virginia Pharmacy or 
Linmark. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Linmark is one of the rippling effects of Virginia Pharmacy in 
the real estate and fair housing areas. The principles of Virginia 
Pharmacy, as solidified in Linmark, will have a far-reaching impact 
on the commercial world. Having created a new constitutional 
interest in the free flow of truthful and legitimate commercial 
information, the Court has rapidly expanded its coverage in a case-
by-case analysis. It has already placed a dent in the once 
impenetrable edifice of legal advertising bansl60 and has even 
reached into such areas as the sale of contraceptives to minors.161 
Questions remain, however, as to the strength of the governmental 
interest necessary to restrict different kinds of commercial speech 
under particular circumstances. 
ADDENDUM 
Russell C. Minkoff 
John Bennett Sinclair 
Since the initial printing of this Comment, there have been two 
significant developments in Maryland with respect to "For Sale" 
sign prohibitions. Ordinance No. 701 has been undergoing judicial 
scrutiny in Baltimore City, while a new sign ban of dubious 
constitutional validity has been adopted in Baltimore County. 
As mentioned in the Comment, a group of black realtors, with 
the intent to challenge the city ordinance, posted "For Sale" signs on 
various properties in Baltimore. Their challenge was accepted by the 
city. On December 13, 1977, the city filed a bill of complaint seeking 
a permanent injunction in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City 
against James Crockett, a black realtor from West Baltimore. 
159. Id. 
160. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). 
161. See Carey v. Population Services International, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977). 
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The sign which triggered the action was posted in front of a row 
house in the 1900 block of McCulloh Street in Baltimore. As this area 
has had a predominantly black population for many years, the city 
will be hard pressed to establish en masse panic selling of the type 
necessary to possibly avoid the application of the Linmark ruling in 
court. The ordinance will probably be overturned because its 
application to a predominantly black area is overbroad and because 
of the Linmark rule. 
On January 3, 1978, the Baltimore County Council voted five-to~ 
two to accept Bill No. 172-77, as amended, which imposes a thirty-
day limit on the display of "For Sale" signs in designated 
"prohibited display areas." In so doing, the council remedied the 
procedural defects that invalidated its 1972 sign ban. The bill was 
not signed by County Executive Theodore Venetoulis, but became 
law, nevertheless. 
As orginally conceived by Councilperson Gary Huddles (D., 2d), 
the sign ban bill would have permitted the council to prohibit real 
estate sales signs in a designated area for up to two years at a time if 
fifteen percent of the property owners (at least ten persons required) 
petitioned the council. If the council received a petition, held a public 
hearing, and determined that "the sales displays could be damaging 
to the health and/or general welfare of the public within all or any 
portion of the area under petition," then the council would be 
permitted to impose a "For Sale" sign prohibition. 
The sting of Bill No. 172-77 was markedly soothed - but only 
temporarily - by an amendment by Councilperson Clarence E. 
Ritter (R., 3d), which was passed four-to-three. The Ritter Amend-
ment provided that even if an area obtained a sign prohibition 
designation from the county council, signs could still be placed on 
properties in the area for "a period not longer than thirty days after 
the date of the real estate listing." Councilperson John V. Murphy 
(D., 1st), a supporter of the original Huddles version of the bill, 
stated that the council had "taken the heart out of the bill . . . 
because the thirty-day period is when the damage is done." After 
expressing their dismay at the passage of the Ritter Amendment, 
Councilperson Huddles and his supporters nevertheless voted for the 
amended bill, recognizing political realities and wanting some form 
of sign ban. On February 7, 1978, however, a final amendment 
striking the thirty-day grace period was passed; presently, then, the 
enactment conforms to the original Huddles proposal. 
The Baltimore County sign ban bill is probably in violation of 
the United States Constitution. That an "emergency" situation 
might be an exception to Linmark will be of no aid to supporters of 
the bill, for sign bans can be imposed under the bill in situations far 
less serious than emergencies. 
